Introduction
Real business cycle (RBC) models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982 ) impose a strong discipline on the choice of consumption and hours, both intertemporally and intratemporally. In these models, the optimal choice of hours is determined in equilibrium such that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (mrs) is equal to the marginal productivity of labor (mpl) . The data show, however, that there is a substantial wedge between these two quantities that strongly co-varies with the economic cycle. In their seminal work, Chari Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) (henceforth CKM) conclude that, along with the e¢ ciency wedge, the labor wedge accounts for most of the ‡uctuations in output, putting it at the center of their business cycle accounting research program. 1 We interpret this …nding as an indication of a signi…cant misspeci…cation of the prototype RBC model as it relates to the labor market. Search and matching frictions (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000) introduce a wedge between the wage and both the mpl and the mrs, providing a natural framework to address misspeci…cation related to labor market imperfections. It is indeed tempting to think that these type of frictions will induce endogenous movements in the optimal choice of hours worked that could manifest themselves as labor wedge.
In this paper, we …rst present a model with labor market frictions-in the form of search and matching-that nests a prototype RBC model a la CKM; then, we ask whether the labor wedge, as usually measured, could be an artifact of these frictions and if so, to what extent.
We show that search frictions primarily manifest themselves at the extensive margin, in employment ‡uctuations, but not at the intensive margin-which is the focus of the business cycle accounting literature. In other words, the equation used to back out the labor wedge is una¤ected by search frictions directly or explicitly over the cycle. The reason is that the business cycle e¤ects of these frictions are absorbed in the wage bargaining quite e¢ ciently, inducing a demand and supply of hours per worker that is close to the social planner solution.
More speci…cally, even though the Nash bargaining over hours and wage actually distorts the 1 The business cycle accounting research program has the goal of identifying promising modeling avenues for dynamic general equilibrium models by measuring the "discrepancy" between the data and a prototype real business cycle model. CKM identify four wedges: the e¢ ciency, labor, investment and government consumption wedge. The labor and e¢ ciency wedges are measured to be the most important, suggesting that macro models that would like to explain real macro ‡uctuations should pay more attention to understanding what type of frictions could manifest themselves as these wedges.
…rm's perceived bene…t of increasing hours per worker, this distortion is constant over time.
There is, nonetheless, an important di¤erence between our search model and the prototype RBC model: backing out the labor wedge in the RBC model requires to accept the full employment implication and replace hours per worker with total hours, distorting the measurement of the mrs and introducing a procyclical bias in the labor market equilibrium condition. This is not the case for the search model that naturally distinguishes between intensive and extensive margin.
We show the potential impact of ignoring the extensive margin in a simulation exercise where we back out the labor wedge in the prototype RBC model, as in CKM, using the search model as the data generating process. Results show that even though there is no labor wedge in the simulated data by construction, one can falsely measure a signi…cantly procyclical and variable labor wedge if the distinction between the intensive and the extensive margin is ignored. About 15 percent of the relative variation in the labor wedge and all its comovement with output and total hours could be explained by this misspeci…cation.
We complement this result with a direct comparison of the labor wedge measures derived from the prototype RBC model and our model with search frictions. Using U.S. data, we show that the labor wedge we obtain is less variable and procyclical than the prototype labor wedge.
This result is sensitive to the exact parameterization of the labor supply elasticity. We …nd that, for instance, when the Frisch elasticity is relatively high, such as 2.8, as in most macro models, we can get up to 20 percent decline in the variability of the labor wedge. Similarly, we …nd a reduction in the procyclicality. This result is even stronger, a 40 percent reduction, for Frisch elasticities that are more consistent with the micro estimates. Moreover, we show that our results are not an artifact of the generalized Nash bargaining. Analyzing the implications of alternative wage determination mechanisms used in the literature, such as right-to-manage bargaining or rigid wages, we conclude that our results are very robust, even though these assumptions have di¤erent implications over other dimensions of the model such as the behavior of the extensive margin. In fact, search frictions do not matter for the intratemporal condition that relates mrs and mpl but they are potentially very relevant at the extensive margin in relation to employment dynamics. We leave an exhaustive analysis of the labor wedge at the extensive margin for future work, but present some examples to highlight its importance in section 8.
The next section discusses the related literature, especially that on the business cycle accounting and the labor wedge. Section 3 and 4 present an extension of the prototype RBC model with search frictions and how it nests the prototype model. Section 5 discusses how search frictions imply a di¤erent labor wedge. Section 6 shows, quantitatively, how search frictions alter the labor wedge, …rst by using the model generated data and analyzing the behavior of labor wedge in these simulations, then by using the U.S. data and focusing on only one equilibrium condition. We present a discussion of the alternative mechanisms for wage determination and the link between the extensive margin and search frictions in Section 7 and 8, respectively. The last section concludes.
Related Literature
This paper is part of the vast literature that studies labor market imperfections in connection with the business cycle, such as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , Cole and Rogerson (1999) , and Shimer (2005) , among others. The extension of the standard growth model we use is most closely related to Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995 Merz ( , 1999 , which embed search frictions into an otherwise standard RBC model.
The focus on the labor wedge makes the paper naturally related to the recent literature on business cycle accounting, which, in di¤erent forms, dates back before CKM. 2 For example, Hall (1997) as measured in the aggregate data, might be partly due to aggregation bias. They show that a heterogenous-agent economy with incomplete capital markets and indivisible labor can generate this observed wedge. Arseneau and Chugh (2010) also analyze a general equilibrium matching model with distortions that map into a labor wedge. Even though the focus is on optimal tax policy, they show that, as in our paper, the labor wedge takes two di¤erent forms with matching frictions, one intratemporal and one intertemporal. 3 They do not, however, have an intensive margin, but a labor force participation margin instead. One example of an RBC model with both margins is Cho and Cooley (1994) . Variation in the extensive margin is introduced via a …xed cost of supplying labor. It is easy to show that even in Cho and Cooley (1994) , one can get two distinct labor wedges as ours, and the labor wedge for the intensive margin will take the exact same form. Instead of an ad-hoc adjustment cost, we prefer search frictions to introduce both margins in a more conventional modelling environment which easily nests the prototype RBC model. 4 More recently, Blanchard and Gali (2010), Cheremukhin and Restrepo-Echavarria (2010) and Shimer (2009 Shimer ( , 2010 focus on the variation in the labor wedge. Shimer (2009) reviews the literature and makes a case for focusing on the labor wedge, as it is relatively immune to how the model environment is speci…ed and the expectations are formed. Cheremukhin and RestrepoEchavarria (2010) lays out an RBC model with search frictions and argues that most of the variation in the labor wedge is attributable to the residual shock to matching e¢ ciency, rather than variations in job destruction or impediments to the bargaining process. Their modelling choice is less conventional than ours, hence less comparable to prototype RBC models, and lacks an intensive margin. The focus of their paper is to identify what speci…c friction -among possible labor market frictions -is causing variation in the labor wedge. Both Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Shimer (2010) , di¤er in their formulation of the search frictions from us, and derive a neutrality result: In a model without capital, ‡uctuations in the unemployment rate are independent of aggregate productivity. In Blanchard and Gali (2010) , this is due to the fact that recruitment of …rms is not a¤ected by aggregate productivity. As Shimer (2010) argues, this follows when one assumes that recruitment is only labor-intensive, not good-intensive. 5 3 See sections 5 and 8 of the current paper for more on this distinction in our model. 4 The distortion for the extensive margin in Cho and Cooley (1994) is di¤erent from the one we have, since employment choice is still not subject to any intertemporal distortion in their work. 5 We favor a more traditional approach, as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) , and model recruitment as a good-intensive technology. Hence …rms respond to productivity shocks by increasing recruitment during booms. We …nd it reasonable to assume that, at least partially, …rms cannot just bear the cost of recruitment by costlessly switching workers from production to recruitment in response to productivity shocks.
Shimer (2010) also arrives at a conclusion similar to ours; namely search frictions per se will not help explaining the labor wedge. In section 8 we discuss in more detail the similarities between our analysis and arguments in Shimer (2010).
Search Frictions and Employment Fluctuations
The model is a decentralized complete-market version of Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) .
The labor market is non-Walrasian: Search and matching frictions-summarized by a matching function at the aggregate level-may prevent full employment and allow for movements in both the intensive and the extensive labor margin. The labor contract is determined through bargaining between households and …rms. Consumption and capital goods, instead, are exchanged in perfectly competitive markets. Finally, the model is laid out such that it nests the prototype real business cycle (RBC) model described in CKM.
Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of in…nitely-lived worker-households distributed uniformly along the unit interval implying a constant labor force normalized to one. At any point in time, only a mass n t 1 of households is employed while the remaining 1 n t households are unemployed and searching for a job.
Households earn a hourly wage, w t , from working and receive rental income, r t , from capital that they rent out to …rms. They can invest x t units each period which adds to new capital next period, k t+1 , net of depreciation, . Wedges operate as a tax, following CKM we introduce a tax on investment and labor earnings, [1 + x;t ] and [1 l;t ], respectively. Finally, in each period, households receive a lump sum transfer, T t , from the government. The household utility function is expressed in terms of consumption (c t ) and hours worked (h t )
where is the subjective discount factor, E 0 is an expectation operator, while, without loss of generality, we normalize G(0) = 0 and assume G(x) < 0, 8x > 0. 6 Finally, we de…ne the 6 Additionally, Uc ( ) > 0 , Ucc ( ) 0 , G h ( ) < 0, and G hh ( ) 0. We also assume that standard Inada marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure as
Since markets are complete, providing perfect insurance against unemployment risk, consumption is equalized across households. In this case, it is possible to prove that we can recast the household problem in terms of a large representative household, as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) , that maximizes the sum of its members'expected utility 7
Each unemployed worker exerts some e¤ort, e t , to …nd a job, which costs c(e t ) units of resources. The cost of search function, c(e); is assumed to be strictly convex and increasing in the e¤ort. 8 As a result, the budget constraint of the large household can be written as
When the large household maximizes (3) subject to (4), wages, w t , and hours worked h t are taken as given, since they will be determined through Nash Bargaining (see next section).
Given the complete markets assumption, it is easy to write the law of motion for aggregate capital
where uppercase letters denote aggregate variables; 9 i.e., K is aggregate capital stock, X is aggregate investment etc.
We assume that trade in the labor market is mediated by an aggregate matching function that determines the number of jobs formed in each period as a function of the number of job conditions hold for U ( ). 7 We have made use of the normalization G(0) = 0 and dropped the term (1 nt) G(0) from the objective function. 8 Inclusion of search e¤ort in the model is not necessary for the main message of the paper. However, for technical reasons and a comprehensive treatment of the model we need search e¤ort. See the Appendix E for the description of the technical problem, and how search e¤ort is related. 9 When no confusion is supposed to arise, we will keep using lower case letters to denote both individual and aggregate variables. vacancies, V t ; and the aggregate search e¤ort of the household/workers,
where 0 < < 1, ;t is the period-t realization of a process that governs the e¢ ciency of matching, and the following intuitive restriction applies M t min fV t ; 1 N t g. Using the de…-nition of the matching function, we can write the probability of …nding a job for an unemployed worker as p t = M t (1 Nt)Et , which is taken as given at household level. Job matches that are formed in a period are assumed to become productive in the following period. As jobs are created, they are also being destroyed. Letting denote the period-t fraction of existing jobs destroyed, the law of motion for employment is given by the expression
where 2 [0; 1]. At the household level, employment n t evolves endogenously according to the following, slightly modi…ed equation of motion
We can …nally write down the representative household problem recursively
s:t:
n t+1 = (1 ) n t + p t (1 n t )e t taking w t = w( t ); r t = r( t ), p t = p( t ), and equations of motion for aggregate state variables, K t and N t as given. For notational simplicity, let ! h t = fk t ; n t ; t g and t = f t; K t; N t g denote individual and aggregate state variables for the household, respectively, with t = [ l;t ; x;t ; z;t ; g;t ; {;t ] being the vector of exogenous processes with z;t and g;t to be de…ned later. This optimization problem leads to two conditions that determine the optimal savings and search e¤ort recursively for the large household (details are in the appendix):
The economizing on future search costs, c(e t+1 ); and to get disutility from working G(h t+1 ). The …nal term in brackets represents the net future bene…t arising from the expected persistence of a job match. 10 
Firms
Firms operate a production technology, z;t f (k t ; l t ), that is constant returns to scale with respect to capital and labor, and is governed by an exogenous aggregate productivity process z;t . The production function satis…es standard restrictions; furthermore, we assume that its curvature is constant such as f ll (k t ; l t )l t =f l (k t ; l t ) = . The labor input is total hours, l t , which is given by the product of employed workers and hours per worker l t = n t h t . We can, thus, de…ne the marginal productivity of labor as
While capital is rented in a perfectly competitive market, …rms must undergo a costly search process before jobs are created and output is produced. For each job vacancy created in periodt, …rms pay units of output resulting in period-t "vacancy-posting"costs of v t . Jobs must be 1 0 Given that any single current-period match survives with probability 1 , households' expected utility will increase simply by reducing expected future recruiting costs by the quantity
(1 ). The second term in this sum, pt+1et+1
, represents the reduction in the future job-…nding rate, due to the current depletion of the unemployment stock.
posted as vacancies before they can be …lled. We assume that vacancies adjust in equilibrium such that the value of an additional vacancy is driven to zero.
We are going to approach the …rms'problem in two steps. In the …rst step, …rms decide how much capital to rent and how many jobs to create taking the rental rate r t , aggregate state variables, the employment contract fw t ; h t g, and the probability of …lling a vacancy, q t ; as given 11
where
Firms'problem in (15) implies a set of …rst order conditions that determines the optimal level of capital stock rented and the number of vacancies posted by …rms.
The …rst condition is the familiar relation between the rental rate and the marginal product of capital. The second condition determines the optimal number of vacancies posted by …rms, equating the expected marginal cost of …lling a vacancy and its expected marginal bene…t. 12 
Employment Contract and the Nash Bargaining
Since negotiating a wage has an implicit opportunity cost due to search frictions, we need a mechanism to determine the surplus for each contracting party. We assume that each worker's employment contract, fw t ; h t g, is determined through Nash bargaining between the …rm and the household (see for example Pissarides 2000). 13 In a setting like this, where there are multiple workers within a …rm, it is not entirely clear how to formulate the bargaining problem.
Fortunately, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) show that bargaining should happen over the marginal surplus for both parties. 14 Assuming that households (…rms) have a bargaining power of 1 ( ) the generalized Nash bargaining problem takes the following form 15
where W h nt (! t ) is the household's net marginal surplus from having one more worker employed given the household's optimal behavior, and W f nt (! t ) is the …rm's net marginal surplus from having one more employee given …rm's optimal behavior. As long as each party can extract some surplus, i.e. W h nt (! t ) > 0 and W f nt (! t ) > 0, the Nash bargaining problem yields two conditions that determine equilibrium level of hours, h t , and wage per hour, w t (details of the solution are presented in the Appendix E)
Equation (21) is the starting point to determine the hourly wage and basically divides the total surplus of the marginal match among the household and the …rm. Notice that l;t exogenously reduces the household's share of surplus and, in the limit l;t = 1; the household's surplus is zero W h nt = 0: Household risk aversion adds a time-varying dimension to the sharing rule: in times of high marginal utility households claim a relatively higher surplus. Equation (22) is the …rst order condition with respect to hours. This equation relates the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal productivity of labor. As we show later, this equation plays a crucial role in the analysis of the labor wedge.
These two conditions complete the necessary set of equations that fully characterize the equilibrium.
Equilibrium
Since all households and …rms are identical, in equilibrium, individually e¢ cient allocations coincide with the aggregate, i.e. k t = K t , c t = C t , l t = L t , n t = N t , therefore the relevant state is t . Then the competitive equilibrium of this economy is characterized by a list,
that satis…es the equilibrium conditions implied by household and …rm optimization, (12) (13) and (18) (19) , Nash bargaining, (21) (22) , as well as equations of motion for aggregate states, (5) and (7). 16 Finally, g;t represents a dissipative wedge that can, alternatively, be interpreted as a government spending shock. It is also possible to pin down the aggregate resource constraint by exploiting the free entry condition for …rms which imposes that all the ‡ow pro…ts net of recruitment expenses are exhausted in equilibrium
Note that, search frictions do not a¤ect the consumption Euler equation and the resource constraint in a signi…cant way. 17 However, ‡uctuations in the extensive and intensive margin, along with the search decision, give rise to additional equilibrium conditions for employment, search e¤ort, e t , and job vacancies, v t , that are absent in the prototype business cycle model.
For the purpose of this paper, we can focus our analysis on the static equilibrium conditions that describe the labor wedge in (21) and (22) . Next sections explore this in detail.
The Perfectly Competitive Labor Market
Once search and matching frictions are relaxed and the labor market is assumed to be Walrasian, the model presented above nests the prototype RBC model described in CKM.
Since there is no surplus to share, the Nash bargaining is replaced by having …rms and households optimally choosing hours. In the case of …rms, the absence of frictions is equivalent to setting = 0 and choosing hours worked to maximize (15) subject to equation (16) . Optimality requires the wage to be equal to the marginal productivity of labor 18
In the case of households, the absence of frictions is equivalent to setting c(e) 0 and choosing hours worked to maximize (9) subject to equations (10) and (11). Optimality requires the net wage to be equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, which deliver the labor supply schedule
Given the absence of frictions and the presence of a Walrasian auctioneer, the labor market is in equilibrium all times and full employment is guaranteed, i.e., n t = 1 8t. Equilibrium in the labor market can, thus, be represented by the following equation
Finally, in addition to equation (24) and setting n t = 1 at all times, equations (5), (12), (16), (18) , and (23) summarize the equilibrium which is identical to the equilibrium of a standard real business cycle model.
Once functional forms and a parametrization are suitably chosen, it is possible to evaluate the RBC model along the labor market dimension by focusing only on equation (24), using data on total hours (l t ), output (y t ), and consumption (c t ). This widely used strategy, however, 1 8 Since the …rm is indi¤erent between changing production through the extensive or intensive margin, equation (19) is always satis…ed. requires to accept the counterfactual RBC implication that n t = 1 and replace hours per worker with total hours, l t = h t , in the evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution-attributing all labor variations to the intensive margin (h t ). In other words, equation (24) is usually brought to the data in the following form
incorporating the full employment implication of the Walrasian assumption.
In the next sections we analyze the importance of this step and its e¤ects on the model's ability to match the data.
The Labor Wedge
The emergence of a wedge is a symptom of model misspeci…cation especially if we cannot provide a clear interpretation of it. In a reverse engineering exercise, we can easily back out the wedge arising from equation (25) when it is brought to the data (we introduce e when we speci…cally refer to the prototype RBC model)
Since the actual labor tax rate does not vary enough at business cycle frequency to explain ‡uctuations in [1 ~ l;t ], the wedge is to be interpreted as a discrepancy between the model and the data. 19 Hence, given that this is the main equation that describes the labor market equilibrium of the prototype RBC model, the literature has dubbed this wedge the labor wedge stressing the fact that it probably refers to a model's misspeci…cation along its labor market dimensions (Shimer 2009 ).
In this section we will compare the labor wedge of the prototype RBC model with the one stemming from the search model. 1 9 The labor wedge seems to have a low frequency movement which might be explained by changes in the taxes (see for instance, Ohanian, Rogerson and Ra¤o, 2008) or changes in the composition of the workforce and the resulting imperfect household aggregation over-time (Cociuba and Ueberfeldt, 2010) . However, at the business cycle frequency, there is a lot of variation in the measured labor wedge that is highly unlikely to be explained by high-frequency changes in labor tax. Moreover, the labor wedge, [1 l;t ], is pro-cyclical (falling during recessions) and is positively correlated with per capita hours worked ( See the appendix for the time-series plot of the measured labor wedge over the period 1959:I to 20010:III.).
The Wage Equation in the Search Model
To facilitate the discussion of what is the analog, in the search model, of the prototype-RBC labor wedge (equation 26) , it is instructive to derive an explicit wage equation. This is accomplished using the equilibrium conditions from household and …rm optimization along with the Nash bargaining solution, equation 21. 20 
The wage bill for an additional worker w t h t is a function of the marginal productivity of employment, z;t f n (k t ; l t ), search frictions and the (extensive) marginal rate of substitution between the number of employed workers and consumption, G(h t )=U c (c t ). It is useful to express the extensive marginal rate of substitution and the marginal productivity of employment in terms of mrs and mpl :
, and z;t f n (k t ; l t ) = mpl t h t . We can thus rewrite the wage equation in a compact form
where t 7 0 is the only term that involves search frictions explicitly. 21 If we combine the wage equation (28) with the condition on hours, equation (22), we can relate both the mrs t and the mpl t to the wage
where we have used the de…nition of the output elasticity to total hours (1 ), which is approximately the labor share. 22 Those two equations are very instructive and resemble the labor supply and labor demand equations of the perfectly competitive model. However, search 2 0 Details are in the Appendix E. 2 1 In the text we have implicitly de…ned t (1 )
Notice that its sign is ambiguous in principle, in fact, we have > 0 when = 0 and < 0 when = 1. 2 2 In the search model, due to the search frictions, (1 ) is not exactly the labor share.
frictions coupled with Nash bargaining introduce two time varying wedges between the wage and both the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal rate of substitution. In fact, even if l;t were constant, the wage would not perfectly co-vary with the mpl and the mrs over the cycle, being a¤ected by movements in the search frictions t and in the way the match surplus is split. In general, the wage will be between the mrs and the mpl, however, when is small, it might be possible to observe w t > mpl t . In part this is due to the presence of which reduces the …rm's perceived bene…t of an extra labor unit. Firms value the bene…t of increasing hours worked h across workers in terms of its e¤ect on the marginal productivity of an extra worker not in terms of the average worker productivity. This creates a distortion since the marginal productivity of employment increases with h less than one-to-one (as long as > 0).
Finally, it is also interesting to note that the …rm bargaining power parameter, , is inversely related to the wage and enters symmetrically in both equations (29) and (30). As we will see, this implies that the bargaining power per se does not a¤ect the labor wedge, as long as there is an interior solution of the Nash Bargaining problem, i.e., 2 (0; 1).
The Labor Wedge in the Search Model
In the model with search frictions, to derive an equation that is similar in spirit to the one arising in the perfectly competitive model, equation (26) , it is best to exploit the solution of the equilibrium employment contract, equation (22):
After substituting the de…nitions of mrs and mpl we have 23
It is striking that while the bargaining process has created a wedge between mrs and mpl, search frictions per se do not appear directly in this equation, which is surprisingly similar to the one of the perfectly competitive model.
Mechanically, this is simply because distortions enter symmetrically and additively in the labor demand and supply equations, hence, when those are equated search frictions perfectly o¤set and cancel out. The same is true also for and which a¤ect mrs and mpl exactly in the same proportion. Intuitively, one reason for this result is that the bargaining process internalizes search frictions through the wage rather than hours. In part this may be due to the fact that search frictions are inherently intertemporal-i.e., it takes time and resources to match unemployed workers with vacant positions-while the measured labor wedge is inherently intratemporal. The e¤ects of intertemporal frictions are absorbed by movements in the wage and the extensive margin, and not in the equation of the labor wedge, which focuses on the intensive margin. It would be premature, however, to conclude that search frictions do not a¤ect the equilibrium allocation. In fact, search frictions impose additional cross-restrictions to variables, mainly intertemporal and in relation to employment, that will be as well challenged by the data-introducing at least a new wedge that might be aptly dubbed the "extensive labor wedge". We will investigate this point further in Section 8.
The only distortion present in (32) is induced by the bargaining problem and summarized by (1 ) . Since the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, this term is constantmaking it irrelevant at business cycle frequency. In any case, at low frequency, this distortion acts like a tax on employment, which is observationally equivalent to a labor income tax; in the baseline calibration takes a value of about 0.35 reducing substantially the steady state value required for l . 24 We can …nally compare the two fundamental equations that are used to back out the labor wedge from the data in the competitive and non-competitive model
The major di¤erence between [1 ~ l;t ] and [1 l;t ] is that in the perfectly competitive model the lack of distinction between the extensive and intensive margin has favored the use of total hours worked in the evaluation of the mrs in place of hours per worker. The presence of n t in the prototype labor wedge equation, however, may arti…cially introduce a strongly procyclical element-given that G h > 0. Employment is instead not present in (34) when we back out [1 l;t ]. Since movements in both margins are not equally signi…cant in driving the business cycle frequency ‡uctuations in total hours, this distinction about the intensiveextensive margin is clearly important. Figure (1) shows the decomposition of total hours into its components. Total hours in the U.S. is clearly procyclical. When total hours is assumed to follow a path where one of the margins is …xed at its historical average and the other margin is assumed to follow the actual path in the data, one recognizes the well-known fact that most of the ‡uctuations in total hours comes from the extensive margin, not the intensive margin (Shimer 2009 ). This stylized fact is particularly relevant when interpreting the results of our exercise. of the procyclicality of employment ‡uctuations in the data-the higher the stronger the procyclicality.
Numerical Results
In this section we present the results of two alternative experiments. In the …rst one, we generate arti…cial data from the search model, keeping l;t constant, and compute the labor wedge as in CKM. Results show that, even though the data-generating process has no labor wedge, a prototype RBC model a la CKM would still measure a strongly procyclical labor wedge. This is very much consistent with the intuition given for the simple example described by equation (35) . In the second experiment, we use U.S. data to draw a direct comparison between the behavior and statistical properties of the labor wedge in the prototype model and in the search model. We …nd that we can account for somewhere between 15 to more than 40 percent of the ‡uctuations in the prototype labor wedge, depending on the parameterization chosen.
Mapping with the Simulated Data

In this section, we use the model as the data generating process and analyze what it implies
for the labor wedge of the prototype RBC model. More speci…cally, we calibrate our model with search frictions and simulate arti…cial data by shutting o¤ all the exogenous shocks (i.e., wedges) except the productivity process, z;t . We set [1 l;t ] to be constant at 0.6 over time.
Then, using the simulated data on consumption, output and total hours, we measure the labor wedge as in CKM. The null hypothesis is no movements in the prototype labor wedge.
Calibration
We follow a standard approach for parameters that are not related to search frictions. More speci…cally, we set = 0:99, = 0:025, as standard in the literature, while we set = 0:36 to match the labor's share in the prototype model. 25 . We adopt a log-log-utility function to follow CKM. To calibrate parameters related to search frictions, we follow an approach that is similar to Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) , and target …rst moments of the labor market variables, n and h. The total recruiting cost share, i.e. v=y, is set to 1:5 percent. We follow Merz (1995) and assume a strictly convex search cost function c(e) = c 0 e , where c 0 is normalized to 1 and the output share of search costs born by workers, c(e)(1 n), is targeted to be 0:5 percent. Unfortunately, there is no guidance in the literature over these parameters and we try to minimize the resource cost of search and recruitment by this calibration. It turns out this is not far from what has been done in the literature before and our results are not sensitive to the exact share of these costs (see Andolfatto 1996) . What is more sensitive is the parameter , that determines the degree of convexity in cost of workers'search e¤ort. As we have argued in section 4.4, in order to have a unique steady state equilibrium we need to have enough convexity in this function. In particular, as converges to 1 we will have multiplicity of equilibria. In our calibration is implied by the relative ratios of the search/recruitment costs in output,
i.e. = 3: 26 The elasticity of matching function and bargaining power of workers (…rms) are calibrated such that the Hosios (1990) condition holds, which implies = : The elasticity of job matches with respect to vacancies, ; is set to 0:5, which lies in the middle of the range of estimates reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) . The quarterly rate of transition from employment to non-employment, , is set at 0:15, following calibration of Andolfatto (1996) and references therein. Five parameters, , , , and are calibrated to match …ve moments, v=y = 0:015, c(e)(1 n)=y = 0:005, n = 0:7074, h = 0:3752, and q = 0:9. 27 2 5 Since total recruiting costs are a relatively small fraction of output, labor's share in the search model is very close to 1 . 2 6 Our results are essentially the same when = 1:5. 2 7 In this exercise, shocks to the matching e¢ ciency are shut down, as well as for l and g ,. The latter two parameters are set to 2=5 and 0:16, respectively, following the averages in the data and the measured labor wedge from the previous section. Our targets for n and h are the sample averages for employment and hours per worker, respectively (the sample is described in Appendix A). The calibration target for q follows from the average duration of a posted vacancy based on van Ours and Ridder (1992). Results Figure ( 2) shows simulated output series and the prototype labor wedge derived under the baseline calibration described above. The standard deviation of e l;t relative to output is 0.15 which makes the null hypothesis of no ‡uctuations clearly rejected. In other words, this implies that doing the business cycle accounting as in CKM would falsely detect the presence of a labor wedge when reality is well described by the labor search model with no exogenous ‡uctuations in the labor wedge. Moreover, the correlation between the labor wedge is strongly procyclical: the correlation with output and total hours is about 0.85 and 0.96, respectively. Hence, a simple extension of the prototype RBC model with search frictions is consistent with a signi…cantly procyclical labor wedge, which is entirely due to endogenous movements in both the extensive and the intensive margins. Those results support the view that search frictions may induce endogenous ‡uctuations in hours and employment that will manifest themselves as a procyclical and variable labor wedge as in CKM or Shimer (2009). 
Mapping the Models to the U.S. Data
As we mentioned in previous sections, employment ‡uctuations make the measurement of g mrs di¤er from the mrs of the search model. This di¤erence is crucial for the labor wedge, because most of its variation is associated with g mrs and not mpl ‡uctuations. Figure ( 3) plots the log-detrended g mrs and mpl jointly with the log detrended prototype labor wedge. In line with the model, the log g mrs, mpl, and [1 e l;t ] has been detrended by subtracting the HP-trend of the log of consumption, output, and consumption-output ratio, respectively. 28 While some low-frequency movements in the labor wedge may be driven by the mpl, particularly between 1982-90, most of the business cycle movements are largely due to ‡uctuations in the g mrs.
Hence, seen from the lens of the perfectly competitive model, labor supply increases less than implied by the model during expansions and it does not fall as much as required by the model during recessions. Given that the search labor wedge de…ned in (32) basically modi…es the g mrs, reducing its procyclicality, the search model points in the right direction.
We recover the labor wedge in the prototype model (1 ~ l;t ) and in the model with labor market search frictions (1 l;t ), from equations (33) and (34), respectively. In conducting this accounting exercise we partly rely on the calibration of the previous section; however, we use a general functional form for the disutility of labor:
. 29 Given the chosen form for G( ), we can write down two equations that implicitly de…ne the prototype and search labor wedges 30
2 8 The calibration strictly follows the one of CKM. Series are demeaned for ease of comparison. 2 9 The commonly used CRRA form G(x) = x 1+ =(1 + ) deliveres fairly similar results. 3 0 The parameters such as and , will take di¤erent values when calibrated in one of the two models. With a loose notation, we denote with a e the parameter value calibrated for the perfectly competitive model. Figure 3 : De-meaned log-detrended g mrs, mpl and the prototype labor wedge, [1 e l;t ]. They are detrended by subtracting the HP-…lter trend of log(c t ), log(y t ) and log(c t =y t ) respectively. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Data on y t , l t ; h t and c t pin down a unique labor wedge for each period in both equations once we calibrate e ( ), and e ( ). We set the parameter e ( e ) such that in steady state e l ( l ) is 0.4, consistent with the tax wedge measured by Prescott (2004) . Finally, we adjust e , to get the same steady state labor elasticity in both models. In the baseline calibration, we choose the limiting case, e = 1, which is also used by CKM and implies a steady state Frisch elasticity of about 2.8, then, in order to get the same elasticity in the search model, we set = 0:6.
Figure (4) shows the results for the 'low-frequency case'when variables are detrended using HP-trends in output and consumption-low-frequency movements are not necessarily …ltered out. The upper panel presents the marginal rate of substitution for both models while the lower panel shows the related wedges. There is a clear low-frequency cycle in the wedges, mainly due to the mpl, that has not been captured by the trend in the consumption-labor ratio. The rise in the labor wedge in the second half of the sample is due to a declining mpl, whether we assume competitive labor markets or not. As suggested by Figure (4) , the search labor wedge is less volatile than the prototype labor wedge, by about 23 percent (see Table 2 ). This is entirely due to our measurement of the marginal rate of substitution, which is about 40 percent , where Frisch elasticity is around 2:8. Detrending uses HP-…lter trend of log(c t ) for mrs and log(c t =y t ) for labor wedges. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates. less volatile than the g mrs measured through (36) . This obviously follows from the fact that the intensive margin is the less variable margin in total hours, which makes the measurement of the marginal rate of substitution in the search model less variable than the one of the prototype model. As shown in Table 2 the correlations of the labor wedge with cyclical variables are substantially di¤erent from zero (excluding the consumption-output ratio). Results are particularly evident at business cycle frequency-in this case every variable in Table 2 , but L t , has been HP-…ltered (shown in Figure 5 ). Given a relatively high Frisch elasticity (about 2.78), at business cycle frequency the search labor wedge is 20 percent less volatile than the prototype wedge (see Table 2 ). As in the low-frequency case, the nature of the decline stems from the measurement of the marginal rate of substitution. Moreover, the correlation with total hours is reduced by about 8 percent while the one with output by 20 percent.
While the calibration of and has no implication for our analysis, results are clearly a¤ected by the choice of the parameter that governs the Frisch elasticity . So far, the Frisch elasticity we have used in the numerical exercises was 2.78, in line with most macro models and chosen to be comparable with CKM. However, this elasticity is at the high end of the estimates found in the micro literature (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999) . In what follows we will show that our results are indeed ampli…ed when the Frisch elasticity is chosen consistent with most of the micro estimates. Low Frisch Elasticity The major problem behind the failure of the prototype model, as well as our extension of it, is that hours do not vary as much in the data as implied by our models. This has been well-recognized in the context of macro models. Higher aggregate micro elasticities tend to produce smaller wedges at the expense of a large micro literature that argues for lower individual labor elasticities. Here, we replicate our exercise by targeting a Frisch elasticity of 0.5 on average, which is more in line with these studies. Figures (6) , (7) and Table 3 present our results. 31 While the overall volatility is higher across variables, there is a dramatic reduction in the volatility of the labor wedge with search frictions of more than 40 percent, both at low frequency ( Figure 6 ) and at business cycle frequency (Figure 7 ). Once again, this reduction is entirely due to the lower volatility of mrs relatively to g mrs. The reduction in correlation with output is about 22 percent at business cycle frequency. Note however, that a lower Frisch elasticity increases the overall standard deviation in both wedges relative to high elasticity case. Given that wages are not very volatile in the data, most macro models favor a high elasticity. However, while in Detrending uses HP-…lter trend of log(c t ) for mrs and and log(c t =y t ) for labor wedges. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession dates. the prototype model the volatility of the g mrs tripled, the low-elasticity mrs volatility is only 1.46 times the high elasticity g mrs, which makes the labor search model much more promising in reconciling micro and macro estimates. 
Alternative Mechanisms for Wage Determination
In this section we show how the labor wedge implied by the search model is substantially robust to alternative bargaining protocols. We argued in the previous section that the labor wedge in the presence of search frictions is not directly or explicitly a¤ected by search frictions. This was partly due to the form of the bargained wage. Hence, it is natural to ask whether this result is robust to alternative wage protocols. To give a comprehensive treatment of this issue, we analyze how equation (32) To provide a basic benchmark we start with the social planner's problem. This avoids the discussion of the wage bargaining altogether, focusing on the equilibrium optimal allocation of hours.
Social Planner' s Problem
Wedges, by construction, operate as taxes, hence are distortionary. In order to formulate the decentralized problem in our model as a planner's problem, suppose we turn o¤ all of the wedges. The social planner's problem is de…ned by maximizing the objective function in (3) subject to the aggregate resource constraint, (23) , and the aggregate matching function, (6) .
Then, it is very easy to show that the optimal hours decision yields the following result
This result highlights how bargaining over marginal surpluses generates a static wedge,
, that a social planner would remove. In other words, socially optimal allocations cannot be decentralized under Nash bargaining, when we have both extensive and the intensive margin.
We know that this optimality condition does not hold in the data, and one can back out the exact same labor wedge we recovered in our model with search frictions, with the exception of the static component (1 ).
Right-to-Manage Bargaining
An alternative to the Nash bargaining that has been used in the literature is the right-tomanage bargaining. 32 This form of bargaining is motivated by empirical observations that …rms set hours unilaterally and potentially bargain over the wages.
Following Trigari (2006), we assume that under right-to-manage bargaining, …rms are free to set hours per worker optimally and take the employment stock and wages as given. This means that mpl t = w t at all times. Since hours are optimally chosen, …rms are indi¤erent about hiring an additional worker. 33 Then, workers and …rms bargain over the wage. This bargaining (20) is zero for any wage, w t . In other words, …rms can always bring the marginal surplus to zero by adjusting the intensive margin. Hence, in setting the wage, workers will maximize their marginal surplus taking into account the optimal choice of hours h t = h(w t ). Since h 0 (w t ) = h t =( w t ), 34 the wage has to satisfy the following equation
3 2 Right-to-manage bargaining is used in the literature, mostly to get a lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output in the standard New Keynesian DSGE models (Trigari 2006 , Sunakawa 2012 . 3 3 Notice that this results is related to assumption that the production function can be written solely in terms of capital and total hours worked-which is an assumption vastly common to the DSGE literature. 3 4 In writing h 0 (w) we have exploited the fact that = f ll l=f l .
In other words, the wage is set as a constant markup, 1= (1 ), over the marginal rate of substitution. 35 In fact, imposing …rms'optimal hours choice in (39) implies that the equation that de…nes the labor wedge is identical to (32) ,
This result shows that a change in the bargaining protocol does not a¤ect our main message that search frictions have minor, if any, cyclical implications for the labor wedge. The existence of both intensive and extensive margins still highlights that the correct marginal rate of substitution that appears in the labor wedge equation is mrs t and not g mrs t . The intuition behind this result is simple: Given a wage, hours are chosen optimally as in an RBC model. The wage setting, however, introduces only a static distortion, (1 ). 36 
Rigid Wages
The Nash bargaining outcome implied by equation (20) Since there is no consensus on the source of this rigidity, we do not want to take a stand on the 'true' macroeconomic model of wage rigidity. Instead, we follow Shimer (2010) and distinguish between a target wage _ w(! t ); which is determined by axiomatic Nash bargaining, which is similar to our formulation above, and the actual wage w(! t ): The actual wage is a weighted average of the target wage and the actual wage observed in previous period.
where determines the level of rigidity.
The target wage is given by the solution to an analog of the Nash bargaining problem we analyzed before,
whereŴ h nt (! t ; w) andŴ f nt (! t ; w) denote marginal surpluses at any wage, w; and are related to W h nt (! t ) and W f nt (! t ) in a simple way:
It turns out that the target wage and optimal hours decision leads to familiar conditions, even with the presence of rigid wages.
The second equation, (44), gives precisely the same static condition for labor wedge measurement. What really changes, is the impact on the extensive margin, as (43) implies that the marginal surpluses at the observed wage will be in ‡uenced by the wage rigidity such that the following holds
and the wedge on the extensive margin is a¤ected signi…cantly, i.e. equation (48) changes to incorporate the wage rigidity. Finally, we can rewrite equation (45) by using the de…nition of the actual (41),
As parties bargain over the wage, the equilibrium surplus sharing rule expressed in equation the economy su¤ers an adverse shock to productivity, after a series of good realizations. Then the likelihood of current target wage being below the previous period's actual wage will be higher, transferring some extra surplus to households than they would otherwise get. This implies lower surplus to …rms creating less incentives to post vacancies and further depressing job creation. The severity of this channel will be a function of the wage rigidity parameter, .
In the absence of wage rigidity , when = 0, this expression collapses to the outcome from e¢ cient Nash bargaining we used in the baseline model, eq. (21).
The particular wage determination mechanism one uses a¤ects the allocations. However, our discussion shows that the focal point on the labor wedge that we stressed, the optimal hours decision, is not a¤ected. What alternative bargaining protocols actually do is to change the response of agents on the extensive margin, job creation decision, search e¤ort choice and the resulting equilibrium unemployment. However, it does not, create a substantially di¤erent labor wedge from the one in equation (32).
Search Frictions and the Extensive Margin
Two main results of our paper seemingly contradict the recent work by Shimer (2010) ; the independence of the labor wedge from search frictions and the relative improvement in the volatility of the labor wedge due to the explicit distinction between the extensive and the intensive margin. Shimer (2010) points out that search frictions are essentially adjustment costs; hence, since standard calibrations of the search models su¤er from an inability to generate enough volatility, he argues that adding adjustment costs this way into an RBC model cannot improve its performance. However, our results complement and reinforce the ones of Shimer (2010). To understand our reasoning, it is important to recall that our formulation of search frictions create two distinct labor wedges; one for the intensive margin, another one for the extensive margin. The former is the main focus of the business cycle accounting exercises.
Hence, most of the studies dealing with the labor wedge focus on this margin as a measure of the inability of di¤erent RBC models to match the data. However, we show that when we distinguish between these two margins, we can explain part of the cyclical behavior of the wedge measured at the intensive margin, at the cost, however, of introducing a second wedge at the extensive margin.
In order to understand the e¤ects of search frictions on the extensive margin, it is crucial to observe that the variation in this margin is governed by mainly two decisions: workers' search e¤ort and …rms' vacancy posting decision. Optimality conditions for search e¤ort and vacancies (see equations 13 and 19) along with the law of motion for employment will govern the movements at the extensive margin. Using equations (13) and (19) , noting that the terms in expectations are each party's marginal surplus from a match, one can write down a simple equation that relates market tightness and search e¤ort to movements in the value of expected surpluses:
Variations in the relative values of expected surpluses will determine ‡uctuations in market tightness, t , and search e¤ort, e t , implying ‡uctuations in employment. Note also that the Nash bargaining outcome requires a speci…c sharing rule determining the relation between (48) Equation (48) shows how the labor wedge for the intensive margin, 1 l , a¤ects employment ‡uctuations. In principle, if this equation does not hold in the data, it will provide us with an estimate of an additional, and a distinctively di¤erent wedge -an extensive labor wedge -that primarily a¤ects the intertemporal margin.
In other words, we conjecture that ‡uctuations in employment introduce an additional challenge for the model when it comes to matching the data. A well-de…ned and satisfactory test of this conjecture requires conducting a full blown business cycle accounting exercise that is beyond the scope of current paper and we leave it to future work.
We can provide, however, an illustrative simple accounting exercise using equation (48) under certain assumptions. To introduce enough degrees of freedom into the model for that purpose, assume that vacancy posting cost, , varies over time. More for the mrs t at the intensive margin, and the contribution of employment to the total hours variation. As ‡uctuations in the extensive margin play more of a role over the business cycle, the mismeasurement problem in the prototype labor wedge becomes more severe. Hence, search frictions account for more of the variation in the labor wedge for the intensive margin. On the other hand, since search frictions primarily manifest themselves at the extensive margin, as this margin becomes more important for the total labor input, the failure of the model as a whole becomes more severe.
To highlight the signi…cance of the relative contribution of the extensive margin to total hours variation, consider an economy where the intensive margin plays a more signi…cant role in accounting for variation in total hours. For instance, in Germany, intensive margin shows much more cyclicality than the extensive margin relative to the U.S. Data between 1960:Q1-2010:Q4 from Germany indicate that hours per worker is primarily driving the variations in total hours 38 . The standard deviations for total hours, l, hours per worker, h, and employment, n, are 0:0316, 0:0308, and 0:0076, respectively. 39 When total hours is assumed to follow a path where one of the margins is …xed at its historical average and the other margin is assumed to follow the actual path in the data, we see that the intensive margin accounts for almost all the low-frequency variation and a signi…cant portion of the business cycle frequency variation. This is shown for Germany in …gure (9) , which is an analog of …gure (1). Figure 9 : Total Hours decomposition into hours per worker versus employment. Plots for only employment and hours are generated, keeping the respective margin moving where the other margin is assumed to be …xed at the historical average. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recession dates, not those for Germany.
Consequently, when the labor wedge with search frictions, [1 l;t ] ; is measured for Germany, relative to the U.S., the volatility at the business cycle frequency declines by about 10 percent as opposed to 33 percent. On the other hand, the relative improvement in terms of the decline in the measured wedge for Germany with lower Frisch elasticity case is 35 percent relative to 43 percent in the U.S. 40 In other words, as the extent of variation in the extensive margin increases, mismeasurement accounts for less of the measured labor wedge.
Conclusion
The business cycle accounting literature has identi…ed the relation between the marginal productivity of labor (mpl) and the marginal rate of substitution (mrs) as a weakness common to many perfectly competitive RBC models. More precisely, the observed wedge between the mrs and mpl seems to conceal one of the keys that would allow us to improve our understanding of what drives economic cycles. This paper has explored the role of labor-market search models in addressing this weakness.
Our results indicate that labor-market search frictions per se do not provide a mechanism that could directly alter movements in the wedge between mpl and mrs, as observed in the data. The main reason is that the bargaining process between …rms and workers internalize search frictions through the wage decision, rather than hours decision. However, search frictions impact the movements at the extensive margin more explicitly, which we also explore somewhat in the paper.
The advantage of the labor-search model is due to its natural ability to distinguish between ‡uctuations in total hours and hours per worker, leaving no doubt on the fact that the mrs has to be measured in terms of hours per worker. Since ‡uctuations in employment account for the majority of the movements in total hours, confounding hours per worker with total hours leads to a substantial mismeasurement of the mrs and, consequently, a serious misspeci…cation of the model which appears as the labor wedge. Our …ndings show that, at business cycle frequency, about 20 percent of the observed volatility and most of the procyclicality of the labor wedge can be attributed to ‡uctuations in the extensive margin (employment) through their e¤ect on the mrs.
In addition to that, we also cast additional light on how the divergent …nding between macro and micro estimates of the labor supply elasticity is exacerbated by the use of total hours in the measurement of the mrs. The search model is able to take much lower values for the Frisch elasticity without dramatically increasing the volatility of the mrs-which is the main reason for why macro estimates give high values of the labor demand elasticity. We also show that these results are very robust to alternative assumptions about wage determination.
Finally we present some simple discussion and preliminary evidence on the importance of the apparent wedge for the extensive margin in the labor input. We show that search frictions primarily manifest themselves as a wedge on the extensive margin but the relative importance of it will impact the extent of mismeareument for the wedge at the intensive margin, the usual object of interest in the literature. We leave an exhaustive study of the role search frictions play on the extensive margin to future work. 
C Households'Decision Problem
First order necessary conditions and costates for the household's problem (9)- (10) are, (12) . Note that equation (54) implies that E t W h n t+1 (! h t+1 j! h t ) = Uc t (ct)ce t (et) pt . Substituting this expression for E t W h n t+1 (! h t+1 j! h t ) in (56) and taking expectations using (54) gives the households'choice of e¤ort in (13). 
